After the Punjab and Haryana High Court restrained the presiding officer of the Debts Recovery Tribunal-II, Chandigarh, from passing any adverse orders in any of the cases pending before the tribunal until November 30, the presiding officer DRT-2 M M Dhonchak has challenged its order before the Supreme Court.
The high court had on October 27 restrained Dhonchak from passing any adverse order while hearing a petition filed by the Debt Recovery Tribunal Bar Association. Dhonchak had retired as the District and Sessions Judge in March 2021.
The Punjab and Haryana High Court has been hearing a petition filed by the Debt Recovery Tribunal Bar Association. It has levelled allegations against the presiding officer of the Debts Recovery Tribunal-II, Chandigarh, including those of harassment of counsel and long adjournments.
In the Special Leave Petition filed before the Supreme Court of India, Dhonchak has contended, “The suspension of work/strike/boycott of the Courts by the advocates has no legal sanctity, whatsoever. The impugned order passed by the Hon’ble High Court has virtually legalised the illegal and contemptuous boycott of the Tribunal by the Advocates and the same is likely to have a devastating effect not only upon the independent functioning of the Tribunals but also the whole District Judiciary of the country.”
“The sum and substance of the impugned order in virtually allowing the writ petition is indicative of the fact that a Judge shall hold his office only during the pleasure of the Bar. Most of the time, in the Bar Associations, the people who have no briefs, rule the roost and they are instrumental in reaching the decisions … In a nutshell, the impugned order shall not remain confined to the petitioner bashing alone but it would provide a Godsend opportunity to the mischievous elements who remain in search of an opportunity for Judge bashing/battering and in the ultimate making, the impugned order shall prove fraught with turning the things topsy turvy especially when some of the matters in which outer statutory limit to adjudicate is six months, but those are hanging decision for a decade and probably, two too,” said Dhonchak.
The officer said a DRT presiding officer is expected to decide around 500 cases annually and thus, in the tenure of four years, they are expected to decide around 2,000 of them. “When admittedly, in the Tribunal, there are around 11,500 cases, there is no logic of unduly getting bothered with 9,500 cases and the petitioner have/had every right and logic to adjourn around 9,500 cases beyond the tenure of the petitioner which is scheduled to come to an end in February 2026. Moreover, the Board of each Judge has to go in accordance with his convenience, infrastructural capacity, supporting staff and other schemes of things including the expected arrival of urgent matters,” he added.
Dhonchak also pointed out that about a month ago the petitioner had more than 60 cases in which the debt was more than Rs.100 crore. These cases were not to be adjourned beyond a period of seven days as per instructions of the Ministry of Finance, and going by those standards, at least eight such cases were to be fixed on every working day of the tribunal, he added. “It is an uphill task to take up even eight such cases on a day given the quantity and quality of the supporting staff in the Tribunal. It goes without saying that there are urgent matters which need to be adjudicated without any loss of time. Similarly, the pretty old cases are to be adjourned/decided not at the usual pace but at the earliest by granting short adjournments.”
He said they have pointed out several bottlenecks coming in the way of speedy disposal of cases and remedial measures. It was decided during a conference of the DRT presiding officers and the Appellate Authorities held in June this year that in principle that a DRT would not have more than 2,500 cases, he added. “Going by those norms, the cases with DRT-II, Chandigarh, presided over by the petitioner warrant to be handled by five Presiding Officers,” Dhonchak submitted.
“Whether the Hon’ble High Court was justified in arrogating to itself the powers of the Central Government and Chairperson of the Selection Committee constituted for selection of Presiding Officer, i.e. Hon’ble the Chief Justice of India or His Lordship’s nominee Hon’ble Judge of the Supreme Court of India, while passing an order obliquely suspending the Presiding Officer, i.e. the petitioner herein, notwithstanding the fact that such power squarely vests in the Central Government which can exercise the same only in consultation with the Chairperson of the Selection Committee constituted for selection of Presiding Officer?” he said in his petition.