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Putin wants to use Ukraine to remake the world

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Russia’s relations with the West have plummeted, reaching their lowest point since the annexation of Crimea in 2014.

Some observers worry that the risk of full-scale conventional war in Europe is higher than any time since the collapse of the Soviet Union 30 years ago. The proximate cause of this parlous state of affairs is Ukraine, which Russian President Vladimir Putin, like many fellow nationalists, considers an integral part of his country. For them, Western security guarantees to Kyiv are an offense to Russian sensibilities, sovereignty and security.

While that assessment is correct, it is a superficial reading of this moment and its impact. The Ukraine crisis represents a more fundamental challenge to the global order. It is the product of Putin’s most basic beliefs: a conviction that Russia is disrespected in the world; that Moscow deserves a sphere of influence in which its concerns and preferences take precedence over those of the sovereign nations that inhabit the area; and that the West is too divided and the United States too weak to do anything about it. Much rests on the outcome of this crisis, including dynamics in Asia, half a world away.

Russia has massed more than 100,000 troops on its border with Ukraine. Officially the forces are there for exercises and Moscow denies any intent to invade its neighbor. Those declarations have been undercut by demands from Russia — spelled out in formal, precise language in two draft treaties — that the U.S. and NATO pledge that they would not allow former Soviet states to join any Western military alliance, ban the deployment of their weapons in Central and Eastern Europe and remove U.S. nuclear weapons from the continent.

Russia’s demands would render Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, Slovenia, Croatia, Montenegro, Albania, North Macedonia and Bulgaria second-class members of NATO. Ultimately, Putin seeks not just limits on Western military power and capability in Europe — his proposals would prevent former Soviet bloc governments from even accepting Western weapons for their own use — but rollback to its Cold War perimeters.

Those sweeping aims make clear the real stakes in this crisis. It isn’t about the fate of a single nation; rather, the foundational rules of international relations are in the balance. Putin is asserting that Russia’s rights and privileges outweigh those of states on its periphery. He is claiming a sphere of influence, a geographical space in which Moscow’s calculations and concerns prevail over all others. Michael McFaul, a former U.S. ambassador to Moscow, notes that in Russia they speak of “Yalta 2.0,” a reference to the seminal 1945 meeting between Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin that formally recognized the Soviet sphere of influence in Eastern and Central Europe.

The narrowest justification for this extension of power is the protection of Russian nationals displaced or unhomed after the collapse of the Soviet Union. But Putin has acknowledged more sweeping concerns, telling a U.S. talk show host in 2015 that “Russia wants to be respected. Who does not?… This is about taking our interests into consideration.”

Since then, Russian alarm has intensified. The intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) treaty collapsed, allowing the U.S. to move weapons closer to the Russian homeland. Some former Soviet states have joined NATO or have since openly discussed closer relations with or membership with the alliance.

Under Biden, NATO has seen a rejuvenation and focused more on the Russian threat; the U.S. and Europe have been more aggressive in sanctioning Russian officials and companies for behaviors they consider beyond the pale. The strengthening of the Western security architecture and cooperation troubles Putin precisely because it has the potential to counter his efforts to project power and influence in Europe.

This assessment of European actions conveniently ignores Russia’s role in creating insecurity among its neighbors. Moscow glosses over its contribution to the U.S. decision to withdraw from the INF treaty. Even use of the term “near abroad,” a phrase that refers to independent states that emerged after the collapse of the Soviet Union, is enough to set some teeth on edge. The recent deployment of Collective Security Treaty Organization forces to Kazakhstan, the first in 30 years, to stabilize that country is proof that the phrase has meaning and significance.

If Putin was hoping that a Ukraine crisis would divide the U.S. and Europe and split the trans-Atlantic partnership, that bet remains uncollected. It has forced NATO to defend the principle of Ukrainian membership even though that wasn’t on the table.

It obliged Josep Borrell, the chief EU foreign and security policy official, to explicitly reject any idea of a U.S.-Russia negotiation: “We are no longer in Yalta times,” he said. “Spheres of influence for two big powers do not belong… in 2022.” He also added that, “if Russia is really willing to talk about security in Europe, then Europeans have to be part of it. Like it or not, they will have to talk with us, be sure of that.”

Ukraine is half a world away, but the crisis there will shape developments in Asia as well. Japan will suffer negative repercussions in its dispute with Russia over the Northern Territories. Win or lose, Moscow’s position will harden and the prospect of any negotiated settlement that advances Japan’s goals will recede.

Any conflict would demand a U.S. response, a distraction of its time and attention. And while Washington can focus on more than one situation at once, a conflict of this scale and magnitude would drain resources and force a recalculation of equities that could alter diplomatic tactics. If the world seeks to counter or contain Moscow in response, be sure that China will demand a high price for its acquiescence, even though Beijing is uncomfortable with such overtly destabilizing behavior. After all, it overlooked the annexation of Crimea in 2014 even though it set a troubling precedent for Taiwan — a local referendum was used to justify Russian action. More worrying is the prospect of Beijing using a European distraction to push its own claims, increasing pressure on Taiwan, for example, to demonstrate the limits of U.S. protection.

Those outcomes are speculative, but one thing is certain. Putin’s claim to a sphere of influence will be echoed by China. In every conference or meeting on strategic issues that I’ve attended with Chinese interlocutors, participants used Russian prerogatives as a benchmark for their own demands. For years, U.S. readiness to concede that its relationship with the Soviets was characterized by “mutual vulnerability” was of signal importance for the Chinese, who insisted that Washington should be prepared to make the same statement in its relations with Beijing.

That might not sound like much, but allies and partners are very worried about such a policy, as it would signal, at a declaratory level at least, U.S. awareness of the potential costs of a confrontation and could indicate a diminished commitment to their defense.

Ultimately, China, like Russia, wants its concerns foremost in the minds of its neighbors. As then-Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi famously explained at a 2010 meeting, “there are big countries and small countries. China is a big country and that’s a fact.” Since then, the imperative to weigh Chinese preferences has only grown. While Beijing was angered by South Korea’s 2017 decision to deploy U.S. theater missile defenses, the source of its displeasure was not the military consequences of that move — Chinese analysts complained that the batteries could impact their second-strike capabilities, but they knew that it would be marginal at best — but Seoul’s defiance of its wishes.

The U.S. shouldn’t be indifferent to Russian or Chinese concerns. There are ways to negotiate issues that allow all countries to be winners — if, in fact, Moscow and China seek win-win solutions and are not serving up ultimatums. But those agreements cannot be made over the heads of countries most directly affected. The U.S. cannot abandon its core principles — the most important of which is the sovereignty of all countries — without losing its most valuable asset: the trust of its allies and partners.

Brad Glosserman is deputy director of and visiting professor at the Center for Rule-Making Strategies at Tama University as well as senior adviser (nonresident) at Pacific Forum. He is the author of “Peak Japan: The End of Great Ambitions” (Georgetown University Press, 2019).

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